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The paper investigates institutions and organisations dealing with the sharing of water 
at Dzindi, a smallholder irrigation scheme in Limpopo Province where water supply is 
inadequate for full irrigation. Since its establishment, Dzindi has lived through several 
important political changes, which were accompanied by a gradual withdrawal of state 
authority. This has provided the community of plot holders at Dzindi with 
opportunities to internally modify the content and enforcement of existing water-
sharing rules. The paper documents the institutional and organisational changes that 
have occurred in the sharing of water among farmers and explores related perceptions 




Institutions, meaning the rules and their enforcement arrangements 
(Swift and Hamilton, 2001:85; Hubbard, 1997:240 & Eicher, 1999:3), and 
organisations, referring to the structures people create to define, revise, 
and enforce rules (Gabriel, 1999:82), are two important factors in the 
management of shared resources, which in the past have often been 
ignored in smallholder irrigation (Bembridge, 1997:31). Historically, 
institutions and organisations governing African smallholder irrigation 
projects in South Africa were externally created and imposed, because 
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local pre-colonial communities did not practise irrigation (Bundy, 1988). 
The question arises to what extent farmers hang on to existing 
institutions and organisations when power over irrigation projects is 
transferred to them. It is this question that guided the present study, 
which was conducted at Dzindi Irrigation Scheme, hereafter referred to 
as Dzindi.  
 
Dzindi is situated in the Venda region of Limpopo Province and was 
started in 1954. It occupies an irrigated area of 136 hectares, and consists 
of 106 plots of 1.28 hectares each. Most plots are sited on sloping land, 
and have been terraced. The water distribution system consists of a weir, 
which diverts part of the water flowing in Dzindi River into a concrete 
canal for distribution to the individual holdings. The water flows 
continuously through the canal, and all the water that is not used is 
returned to the river. Plot holders practise ‘short furrow irrigation’, a 
form of surface irrigation that is well suited to labour-intensive farming 
systems (De Lange, 1994:12).  
 
The amount of water entering Dzindi is insufficient to allow for full 
irrigation (Cadet, Delcourt, Hoarau, Steinmetz, Ralivhesa, Letsoalo, & 
Van Averbeke, 2003). From the start this necessitated arrangements to 
ensure sharing of water among farmers. The objectives of this paper were 
to document internal and external group dynamics influencing the 
behaviour of plot holders with regard to the sharing of water as 
indicated by changes in the historical and current institutional and 
organisational water-sharing arrangements, to determine the degree of 
compliance of participants with the water-sharing rules, and to explore 




Information on the history of the water-sharing institutions and 
organisations was obtained in two ways. The first involved the 
construction of a time-line (Matata, Anandajayasekeram, Kiriro, 
Wandera & Dixon, 2001:82), in which a collective of 83 farmers engaged 
in the participatory reconstruction of the history of the scheme. The 
second involved individual interviews with five elderly members of the 
scheme, who were present when Dzindi was established. The current 
situation was documented using different sources of information. These 
included written records held by the Scheme Management Committee 
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(SMC), observations of what the various actors involved in the sharing of 
water did, and interviews with different actors. Among the people that 
were interviewed were 16 plot holders, three members of the SMC, the 
local agricultural extension officer, and the two water bailiffs.  
 
Data collection strived towards capturing the full diversity of views and 
practices, and was sustained until all ambiguities had been clarified, and 
no additional information was forthcoming. Depending on 
circumstances, the interviews were recorded on audiotape, written down 
in shorthand, or put to memory, depending on the sensitivity of the 
occasion. In all cases, transcription occurred as soon as possible after the 
interview was held. Trained, Venda-speaking research assistants 
interpreted and translated the interviews from Venda to English.  
 
3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
3.1 Historical institutional and organisational water-sharing 
arrangements 
 
At establishment of Dzindi, the state, personified by a white extension 
officer, presented farmers with a set of rules pertaining to the drawing of 
water from the distribution system. The rules were communicated 
verbally to the farmers. Written records of rules and regulations on water 
sharing dating back to that time could not be found. There is doubt that 
such records were ever held at the Scheme, because farmers, who were 
part of the SMC at establishment, claim never to have seen a copy. 
 
The first water-sharing rule governed access to irrigation water. Dzindi 
was not designed to allow farmers to irrigate whenever and however 
much water they wanted. Instead, the design allowed for farmers to 
irrigate once a week over a period of half a day during daylight hours. 
Farmers were instructed to follow an irrigation timetable, which listed 
the 106 plot numbers and the time periods during which each plot holder 
could draw water to irrigate his or her plot. Farmers failing to make use 
of their allocation forsook irrigation for that particular week, or had to 
irrigate at night. Since water entered the distribution system around the 
clock, all who were prepared to work in the dark were free to use water 
as they wished. 
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The second rule controlled the flow of water in canals. At times, the flow 
reaching farmers’ fields was insufficient to complete the irrigation of an 
entire plot. This applied particularly to conditions immediately after land 
preparation, when the infiltration rate of the soils peaks. Increasing the 
flow of water entering a distribution furrow can be achieved by 
obstructing the flow in the main canal just beyond the outlet to that 
furrow, for example by placing a large stone at the bottom of the canal. 
Obstructing the flow in this way raises the water level in the canal ahead 
of the obstruction, causing more water to enter the outlet. However, the 
rule stipulated that farmers were not allowed to manipulate the flow of 
water in the canals, because this reduced the amount of water being 
made available to farmers farther down the canal.  
 
The third rule was aimed at keeping the water in the canals clean. It 
forbade farmers from washing their bodies or clothes in the canals, 
especially when that involved the use of soaps. 
 
From the start, enforcing the water-sharing rules was left to farmers, who 
were assisted by two water-bailiffs. These were civil servants tasked with 
policing the use of water in the Scheme. They reported offenders to the 
SMC, the elected leadership of the plot holders organisation, not to the 
Extension Officer. When informed of an offence against the rules, the 
SMC imposed a monetary fine. The value of the fine for transgressing 
any of the three water-sharing rules was the same, namely 25 cents. This 
value remained unchanged until 1982. The money collected from fines 
remained available for use by the Dzindi farmer community. Its 
disbursement was controlled by the SMC, and it was primarily used to 
pay for maintenance of infrastructure at the scheme.  
 
A farmer who was accused of an offence, but who failed to attend the 
appointed SMC hearing without an acceptable excuse, or who refused to 
pay the fine imposed on him or her, was invited twice more to a SMC 
meeting. In the absence of a suitable response, the accused was reported 
to the local headman, who, in turn, forwarded the matter to Chief 
Tshivhase, under whose jurisdiction the farmers of Dzindi fell. In all 
cases involving the breach of water-sharing rules brought before him the 
Chief enforced the decisions of SMC without any verification process. 
This indicates that the Chief accepted the legitimacy and powers of the 
SMC when it came to the sharing of water at Dzindi. Involvement of the 
Chief, however, caused the fine to be doubled. One half of the new 
S. Afr. Tydskr. Landbouvoorl./S. Afr. J. Agric. Ext., Letsoalo & Van Averbake 





amount, equal to the original fine, was paid to the SMC, whilst the other 
half was paid over to the Chief as settlement of the case.  
 
3.2 Current institutional and organisational water-sharing 
arrangements 
 
During its fifty-year existence Dzindi, has been exposed to several 
important political changes. These include the transition from being a 
state-supervised project in a declared native area to being part of the 
nominally independent state of Venda in 1979 (Van Averbeke, Letsoalo, 
Mohamed & Khosa, 2004:14-23), and the re-incorporation of Venda into 
South Africa in 1994, which brought with it a policy of irrigation 
management transfer (Perret, 2002). Yet, the institutions and 
organisations governing the sharing of water at Dzindi were never in any 
substantial way. All three rules that were introduced at establishment 
still apply. Enforcing the rules is still the task of two water-bailiffs and 
the SMC, and does not involve the Extension Officer. Even the role of 
Chief Tshivase has been retained.  
 
As in the past, when it comes to offences involving the breaking of water-
sharing rules, the Chief does not alter the decisions of the SMC, and 
when such cases do reach him, the fines are still doubled and distributed 
as before. Most farmers found guilty of offences against the water-
sharing rules comply with the fines imposed by the SMC, and few have 
to be reported to the Chief. Farmers have long since realised that when it 
comes to sharing of water at Dzindi the Chief is little more than an 
extension of the SMC. Therefore, most prefer to accept SMC rulings. The 
SMC still receives, controls and disburses the money for fines. 
 
3.3 Changes in institutional and organisational water-sharing 
arrangements  
 
In 1982, the SMC decided to write down the water-sharing rules. This 
decision was made to provide transparency and consistency in 
application, and also to adapt the value of the penalties to the prevailing 
value of the Rand. In a mass meeting the rules were first recalled, then 
confirmed by all present, and finally written down. The mass meeting 
also decided on the new fines. The fine for obstructing a distribution 
canal was raised from 25 cents to R10 and that for obstructing the main 
canal from 25 cents to R25. According to the bailiffs and members of the 
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SMC, obstructing the flow in canals to raise the level of water is very 
common. One bailiff claimed that he observes at least one such offence 
every day of the week. However, the obstruction rule is no longer 
absolute. In at least one case a farmer has been granted permission to 
obstruct the distribution canal when it is his turn to irrigate. His field 
draws water directly from the main canal and at the inlet the water level 
in the canal is too low for water to enter his field.  
 
The fine for washing body or clothes with soap in the canal was also 
increased to R25. This offence became a lot more common when parts of 
Dzindi that were not irrigable, were made available for settlement. 
Insufficient provision was made to supply the newcomers with water, 
causing them to rely heavily on the water in the canal for most purposes. 
Taking water from the canal is allowed, but some people do not bother 
scooping the water out of the canal to do their laundry. Instead they 
wash their clothes directly in the canal. The 1982 meeting of farmers did 
not reach an agreement on the value of the fine imposed on persons 
irrigating on days or times not allocated to them. The meeting awarded 
the SMC with discretionary powers to make a decision and insisted that 
SMC members should be punished more severely than ordinary farmers, 
because their behaviour was expected to be exemplary.  
 
The records kept by the SMC indicate that the fines for irrigating on non-
scheduled days range between R10 and R100. High fines usually applied 
to cases involving an SMC member. The highest fine on record, which 
amounted to R250, was imposed on an SMC member found guilty of 
irrigating on the wrong day. When water bailiffs observe an offence they 
no longer report it immediately to the SMC. Instead, they reprimand the 
offenders first, and only when offenders refuse to accept blame, fail to 
show remorse, or repeat the same offence in quick succession do the 
bailiffs bring the offenders before the SMC. Selected farmers have 
expanded their plots using land that was not scheduled for irrigation 
when the Scheme was established. Often this involved the irrigation of 
soils that are too shallow or land that is too steep. Usually, the SMC and 
the Extension Officer are aware of these extensions, and in some cases 
have approved them. The SMC’s position is that the water-sharing rules 
stand. In other words, expanding one’s plot does not give one the right to 
more water. It is up to the farmer concerned to decide on how to use the 
water available to him or her in the most efficient manner. Farmers are 
now allowed to exchange irrigation days or times. This has removed 
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some of the rigidity of the rule, but at times the relaxation is being 
abused. Reportedly, instances of farmers irrigating on a day not allocated 
to them without prior arrangement have increased in frequency.  
 
3.4 Degree of compliance with water-sharing rules and related 
perceptions 
 
Farmers commonly break the water-sharing rules at Dzindi, and the 
records of offences kept by the SMC show that some farmers break the 
rules more often than others. Van Averbeke et al., (2004:52-57) 
categorised farmers at Dzindi into three distinct groups. The first group 
was called “vahilimi vhabinduli”, a Tshivenda term that refers to farmers 
who run their farming enterprises as a business and make profits from it. 
The second group was called “vhalimi vha u difusha”. It consisted of plot 
holders who farmed primarily to feed their families. The third was called 
“vhalimi vhatoli”. All plot holders in this group employed at least one full-
time farm worker to farm on their behalf. Exactly half of the 62 offences 
brought before the SMC during the period 2000 to 2003 were committed 
by vhalimi vhabinduli, who, in 2002, constituted 29 % of the plot holders at 
Dzindi. Production of this particular group of farmers was characterised 
by a strong market-oriented focus. In 2002, 81 % of the value of their 
production was realised as sales, compared to a scheme average of 65 %. 
They were also more reliant on irrigated farming for income. On average, 
54 % of their total household income in 2002 was derived from farming 
their plot, whilst the scheme average was only 31 %.  
 
The relatively high frequency of breaking the water-sharing rules by 
members of this group is not surprising. Of all four-farmer groups they 
can least afford yield losses or failures due to water stress, and 
consequently they are prepared to pay the fines when caught. Interviews 
with four of the frequent offenders confirmed that this was indeed their 
stance on the matter. During face-to-face interviews a minority of 
farmers accused the SMC of inefficiency and favouritism for failing to 
deal appropriately with persistent offenders. They all referred to the case 
of a farmer who uses a pump to draw water from the canal to irrigate an 
expansion to his field. When he pumps, farmers lower down the canal no 
longer obtain enough water to irrigate their fields. The problem had been 
reported to the SMC but after more than a year the SMC had not yet 
made a ruling. When asked about it, SMC members indicated that 
discussions were ongoing, and that a ruling would be made soon. The 
S. Afr. Tydskr. Landbouvoorl./S. Afr. J. Agric. Ext., Letsoalo & Van Averbake 





accused farmer justified his action by pointing out that the SMC had 
allocated land for expansion to him, and that this land was located above 
the canal, necessitating the use of a pump.  
 
The majority of farmers that were consulted perceived the fines imposed 
on offenders as too low to act as an effective deterrent. SMC members 
and the extension officer also attributed the high frequency of 
transgressions to the fines not being sufficiently severe. A few farmers 
were of the opinion that fines imposed by the committee were at times 
inconsistent. However, the only case of apparent inconsistency that could 
be traced was that of a SMC member, who was caught twice irrigating 
his fields on wrong days. At first he was fined R250, the heaviest fine 
ever. When a few weeks later he was caught again committing the same 
offence, he was only fined R50, apparently because he showed remorse 
and begged for mercy. 
 
4. IMPLICATIONS FOR SMALLHOLDER IRRIGATION POLICY 
AND EXTENSION 
 
The findings of this case study show that imposition of institutional and 
organisational arrangements governing the sharing of water in African 
smallholder irrigation projects by an external authority is not inherently 
unsustainable. At Dzindi, a set of three simple water-sharing rules 
introduced by the state 50 years ago has survived, basically in unaltered 
form. Over time, farmers have acquired the necessary power and 
opportunity to change the arrangements, but so far they have not done 
so. This suggests that the original institutional and organisational 
arrangements have inherent strengths, which continue to appeal to 
participants.  
 
One of the strengths is that the sharing rules are equitable. A second is 
that the rules make sense to participants. They have clear objectives, to 
which the farmer community subscribe. A third is that enforcement of 
the rules involves an organisational arrangement that does not threaten 
social coherence of the farming community at large. From the start, the 
task of policing the rules was given to water bailiffs, who are civil 
servants. Farmers consider them as outsiders, and therefore without 
obvious reason for partiality. Moreover, their cost is born by the state. 
Judgments of offenders, decisions on punishment, and use of income 
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derived from fines, are all left in the hands of the farmer community, 
represented by an elected Scheme Management Committee.  
 
The SMC represents the moral authority of Dzindi, a position well suited 
to make judgement and impose penalties. Excluding the Extension 
Officer from the water-sharing institutions and organisations has 
avoided confusion about the function of that office at the Scheme. In 
other situations in the past, adding a policing role to the conventional 
advisory role of extension, for example in programmes of herd reduction 
and livestock dipping (Brown, 1969:85) compromised relationships 
between extension staff and their clients. The findings of this study 
indicate that in situations where water supply is limited, there are 
serious constraints to the commercialisation trajectory supported by the 
current government (Department of Agriculture, 2001:3).  
 
At Dzindi, it was the group of market-oriented farmers who breached the 
water-sharing rules most often. Supporting commercialisation among 
irrigation farmers on projects such as Dzindi, without attending to 
limitations in the supply of water, is likely to lead to an increase in 
conflicts over water. When one of the resources is common property, 
such as water at Dzindi, commercialisation may lead to attempts by 
commercial producers to individualise the resource (Cousins, 1995:6). As 
a result conflicts among farmers may arise, and these may lead to 
irreparable schisms within the community concerned. Experience 
elsewhere has shown that social conflict may lead to the collapse of 
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